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Abstract:  
Many of the EU accession countries are confident that membership will result in 
substantially increased inward foreign direct investment (FDI). At the same time, 
other peripheral EU members (such as Spain and Portugal) are concerned that FDI 
will be displaced to these new countries.  I postulate that the new members cannot 
expect the same increased FDI flows that resulted to earlier EU entrants. Both groups 
of countries cannot base their industrial development strategy on passive reliance on 
such flows. Reliance on low costs and other ‘generic’ advantages such as basic 
infrastructure is myopic in a globalised world. Benefiting from FDI requires a 
comprehensive strategy to build up domestic absorptive capacity and upgrading of the 
quality of their location advantages, since they are faced with increased competition 
for FDI not just from other European countries but also from other parts of the world, 
most notably Asia. 
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I do not think it is an exaggeration that policy makers in most European countries 
seem to consider inward foreign direct investment (FDI) as an indispensable part of 
their industrial development strategy.  This is especially the case in the smaller, less 
economically developed, more ‘peripheral’ economies of the EU, such as Greece, 
Spain, Portugal, Ireland (referred to here as the ‘cohesion’ countries) as well as the 
candidate and accession countries of central and eastern Europe (CEE). This paper 
will discuss the changing role of FDI in these countries, particularly in terms of the 
costs, benefits, opportunities and limitations of an FDI-driven industrial development 
strategy. I will focus on discussing the policy issues and challenges that face these 
countries. The two groups are closely related: The CEE countries look to duplicate the 
benefits that have accrued to Spain, Portugal and Ireland from FDI. The cohesion 
countries, on the other hand are concerned that EU enlargement will result in a certain 
amount of displacement of FDI as their comparative advantage within the EU as low-
cost locations is usurped by the CEE countries.   
 
 
Some stylised facts about FDI-assisted development strategies FDI 
 
Although inward FDI does not represent the only option available to promote 
economic catching-up, it may represent the most efficient option (Dunning and Narula 
2004).  FDI, however, is not a sine qua non for development. There are three other 
conditions that need to be satisfied: 
1. Does the kind of FDI being attracted generate significant spillovers?  
2. Does the domestic sector have the capacity to absorb these spillovers?   
3. Is the FDI that is being attracted, a substitute or complementary to domestic 
industry? 
 
It is true that the determinants of economic development are similar to the 
determinants of FDI, but this does not mean that there is a simple cause and effect 
between them. Particular types of FDI tend to be attracted to countries with certain 
levels of economic development and appropriate economic structures. But simply to 
‘pump’ a country full of FDI will not catapult it to a higher stage of development.   
I will highlight two points here. The first is that FDI without the appropriate domestic 
absorptive capacity, even if it were to be attracted through large subsidies is unlikely 
to become embedded, or provide significant externalities and spillovers to the host 
economy.  
Second, not all FDI is equal in the nature of the benefits it provides. The quality 
of the spillovers that derive from an investment are associated with the scope and 
competence level of the subsidiary, and these are co-determined by a variety of 
factors. These include MNE internal factors such as their internationalization strategy, 
the role of the new location in their global portfolio of subsidiaries, and the 
motivation of their investment are pivotal in the structure of their investment, in 
addition to the available location-specific resources which can be used for that 
purpose (Benito et al 2003). High competence levels require complementary assets 
that are non-generic in nature, and are often associated with agglomeration effects, 
clusters, and the presence of highly specialized skills. In other words, firms are 
constrained in their choice of high competence subsidiaries by resource availability. 
For instance, R&D activities tend to be concentrated in a few locations because the 
appropriate specialized resources are associated with a few specific locations.  The 
embeddedness of firms is often (but not always) a function of how long the MNEs 
have been present, since firms tend to build incrementally. MNEs build on location 
advantages that already exist in the host economy, and increases in embeddedness are 
generally in response to improvements in the domestic technological capacity.  
However, while the scope of activities undertaken by a subsidiary can be modified 
more or less instantly, developing competence levels takes time. MNE investments in 
high value-added activities (often associated with high competence levels) have the 
tendency to be ‘sticky’.  Blomstrom and Kokko (1997) suggest that some of the host 
country characteristics that may influence the extent of linkages – and thereby in the 
longer term the extent of spillovers – are market size, local content regulations and the 
size and technological capability of local firms. They argue that there is a propensity 
for linkages to increase over time, as the skill level of local entrepreneurs grows, new 
suppliers emerge and local content increases.  
MNEs are unwitting development tools: their primary objective is to generate profits. 
They do not provide opportunities for development because they are philanthropic; 
they do so because they need to do so to optimize their profit making potential. MNEs 
seek to optimise their return on investment, and this logically requires that they 
minimize their costs. MNEs do not make investment decisions lightly, or without 
consideration of the benefits. MNEs are creatures of the market par excellence, 
responding efficiently to supply and demand conditions, and changes in these. They 
do not make such investments unless there is an opportunity for rent-seeking. 
MNEs do not make available their proprietary assets available at the whims of 
governments; rather they tailor their investment decisions to the existing market 
needs, and the relative quality of location advantages, but especially the skills, 
capabilities and infrastructure in which the domestic economy has a comparative 
advantage. It is also clear that the kind of FDI activity a country might attract (or wish 
to attract), too, at different stages of development, are different (Dunning and Narula 
1996, 2004).  The motive of the investment is crucial in determining the extent to 
which linkages and externalities develop. The motive of an investment helps to 
determine (in conjunction with the host-country specific factors) the kind of MNE 
affiliate and therefore the potential for spillovers. It is generally acknowledged that 
there are four main motives for investment: 1) to seek natural resources; 2) to seek 
new markets; 3) to restructure existing foreign production through rationalization and 
4) to seek strategically related created assets. These in turn can be broadly divided 
into two types. The first three represent motives which are primarily asset-exploiting 
in nature: that is, the investing company's primary purpose is to generate economic 
rent through the use of its existing firm-specific assets. The last is a case of asset-
augmenting activity, whereby the firm wishes to acquire additional assets which 
protect or augment their existing created assets in some way. In general, developing 
countries are unlikely to attract much asset-augmenting FDI, but tend to receive FDI 
that is primarily resource-seeking, market-seeking or efficiency seeking. The relative 
importance of each is a function of the stage of economic development which itself is 
a function of the quality of its absorptive capacity (Narula 2004).  
The point here is that not all affiliates provide the same opportunity for spillovers. A 
sales office may have a high turnover, employ a large staff, but the technological 
spillovers will be relatively fewer than, say, a manufacturing facility. Likewise, 
resource-seeking activities, can be capital intensive, but also provide fewer spillovers 
than say, a market-seeking type of FDI. Prior to economic liberalization and EU 
integration, MNEs responded to investment opportunities primarily by establishing 
miniature replicas of their facilities at home, although the extent to which they are 
truncated varied considerably between countries. The extent of truncation was 
determined by a number of factors, but by far the most important determinant of 
truncation- and thereby the scope of activities and competence level of the subsidiary 
- were associated with market size, and capacity and capability of domestic industry 
(Dunning and Narula 2004). There is thus a hierarchy of the quality of FDI activity in 
Europe which reflects the stage of industrial development. At the ‘bottom’, CEE 
countries without a domestic sector and with low demand have been host to the most 
truncated subsidiaries, often to the point of being single-activity subsidiaries. 
Activities were primarily in sales and marketing, and natural resource extraction. The 
most advanced economies with domestic technological capacity (such as the core EU 
members) have hosted the least truncated subsidiaries, often with R&D departments.  
Cohesion countries (with the exception of Greece) have been in the middle.  
The CEE countries will not necessarily benefit from an increase in the quality of FDI 
that they receive because of EU membership. Although there will be some investment 
in new affiliates resulting in new (greenfield) subsidiaries that did not exist 
previously, there will also be a downgrading of subsidiaries. MNEs may divest their 
operations in response to better location advantages elsewhere in the EU (as Spain 
and Portugal are now experiencing as their low cost advantages are eroded), or reduce 
the intensity of operations by lowering the level of competence and/or scope of their 
subsidiary, and shifting from truncated replicas to single activity affiliates.  There may 
also be redistribution effect. That is, sectors that were dominated by domestic capital 
were transferred to foreign ownership. This has also, in many cases, led to a 
downgrading of activities from truncated replica to single activity affiliates. 
MNEs have taken advantage of the EU single market to rationalise production 
capacity in fewer locations to exploit economies of scale, especially where local 
consumption patterns are not radically different to justify local capacity and where 
transportation costs are not prohibitive. This has meant that some miniature replicas 
have been downgraded to sales and marketing affiliates, which can be expected to 
have fewer opportunities for spillovers.  It is ironic that the countries that receive the 
kinds of FDI that has the highest potential benefits vis-à-vis industrial development 
are those that already have a highly developed domestic absorptive capacity. 
In other words, domestic capacity – whether in the form of knowledge infrastructure 
or efficient domestic industrial sector - is a primary determinant of high competence 
foreign affiliates. Some countries have succeeded in attracting such FDI, notably 
Ireland.  
 
By focusing on promoting and attracting MNEs as the primary aspect of their 
industrial development strategy, many countries neglect the need to promote their 
domestic sector. If no domestic sector were to exist there can be no opportunity to 
absorb spillovers from FDI: In a perfectly liberalised world, MNEs have no incentive 
to encourage the development of domestic firms to meet their needs since they can do 
so using either imports or FDI. In an extreme case, there may actually be no FDI 
inflow, because MNEs will prefer to locate production in a regionally optimal 
location and simply import. The benefits of FDI only occur when there is domestic 
investment, and where the domestic investment has the ability to internalise the 
externalities from FDI.  
 
Over-estimating the effect of EU membership on FDI inflows 
 
EU membership per se does not necessarily lead to an increase in the quality or the 
quantity of FDI that a country will receive. This is best illustrated by the case of 
Greece. In 1980, inward FDI stock was $ 5.5 billion compared with $3.6 billion and 
$5.4 billion in Portugal and Spain. By 2003, FDI stock in Greece had grown to only 
$17 billion, compared with $53 billion and $ 230 billion for Portugal and Spain 
respectively.   
It is important to highlight that while EU membership is an important determinant in 
promoting, it is not EU membership that is important, but what it implies. I argue here 
that the implied benefits from EU membership are decreasingly important, partly 
because these advantages are less significant as the number of EU members increases. 
Furthermore, globalisation and the growth of supra-national agreements  (particularly 
those associated with the WTO) mean that several of these benefits are not as unique 
as they once were.  Firms from outside the EU are not forced into EU-based 
production as often since tariff and non-tariff barriers are fewer. Lastly, the growth of 
peripheral trade and investment agreements with non-EU members (such as the EU 
agreement with Mexico) also erode the value of EU membership somewhat (but not 
completely of course). 
Membership of the EU implies two things. First it allows countries that have small 
domestic markets to expand their de facto market size.  Firms located in the EU have 
access (in theory) to the entire EU.  However, as the number of countries in the EU 
increases, this advantage is shared by at least 25 countries, even more if one includes 
countries that have preferential access to the single EU market through various lesser 
forms of trade agreements. Thus this advantage has considerably less value to the 
candidate and accession countries than it had for the cohesion countries.  
Second, membership suggests political, economic and legal stability.  This implies an 
overlap of formal and informal institutions. As with membership, this provides a 
location advantage vis-à-vis unstable non-members, but not necessarily so compared 
to non-members who are stable (for instance, some East Asian countries), or relative 
to other long-standing EU members. Again, the greater the number of countries that 
are members, the less stability counts as a unique advantage to potential investors. 
The point here is that the benefits that accrued from EU membership to the countries 
that joined earlier are substantially attenuated for later entrants to the EU because of 
globalisation. First, because global financial, political and economic liberalisation that 
forms a large part of the globalisation process has ‘levelled the playing field’ in 
lowering the risk associated with trade and investment in most parts of the world 
(Narula 2003). With growing technological convergence, increasing homogeneity of 
consumption patterns and improved communication and transportation facilities these 
factors have reduced the costs associated with supplying EU markets from East Asia 
or the Americas. It is worth remembering that a large part of the inward FDI flows 
from outside the EU prior to 1992 were spurred by the fear of ‘Fortress Europe’. 
These fears have largely proved to be unfounded.  
As such, many of the new entrants to the EU are faced with increased competition for 
FDI not just from other European countries but also from other parts of the world, 
most notably Asia.  
The increased competition for FDI challenges both the cohesion countries and the 
CEE countries. Many (but not all) of these countries seek to compete on the basis of 
two primary location advantages: low labour costs and EU membership. As I have 
discussed above, EU membership is not as much of an advantage in a liberalised, 
stable and shrinking world where distance does not form as much of a barrier to trade 
and investment as it once did. For similar reasons, the low cost advantage of these 
countries has also been dissipated in many cases, particularly where productivity 
gains in China and other Asian economies have grown (Kalotay 2004). These 
countries often also have superior technological infrastructure. Spain and Portugal 
have experienced some displacement of FDI or lost sequential FDI because they have 
not been able to develop location advantages in knowledge- and capital-intensive 
activities to compensate for the rising labour costs that have eroded their industrial 
base in low value adding activities.  
 
FDI and the cohesion countries: policy implications 
In the case of Spain, Portugal and Ireland, I would expect to see some level of 
displacement to the new members in industries where: 
1. Low-cost labour remains the primary reason for location and where the MNE 
subsidiary has not expanded its original low value adding activities towards 
knowledge intensive areas in which the domestic economy has a competitive 
advantage; 
2. Where the MNE subsidiary is not embedded through important linkages to 
other firms in the host economy. When the MNE subsidiary is located close to 
an important customer or supplier, and proximity is important (e.g., because of 
just-in-time delivery) it is unlikely that the firm will relocate; 
3.  Where the sunk costs in the host economy are not high; 
4. Where productivity gains have overcome disadvantages associated with rising 
labour costs. 
 In other words, the most obvious long-term solution for cohesion countries is to 
improve their location advantages in other areas, towards more science-based 
technological sectors. Ireland has succeeded in doing so with its focus on the ICT 
sectors (Barry 2004). Spain and Portugal are home to some of the most efficient and 
productive automotive plants in the world, and are unlikely to lose these operations. 
However, as Rhys (2004) notes, new plants are more likely to be located in the CEEC 
countries. 
The ICT sectors and automotive sectors are less footloose partly because they are 
industries in which these host countries are firmly established locations within the 
major MNEs’ global production networks. In each of these locations, furthermore, the 
MNE affiliates are well embedded in the local economy, and the specialised 
infrastructure to support these sectors is well developed.  
Except where strong domestic sectors and specialised knowledge based clusters exist– 
whether public or private – the CEE countries are unlikely to receive major inflows of 
FDI that are intended to supply the EU as a single market. Much of the FDI flows to 
the countries whose primary location advantages are associated with low costs and the 
presence of ‘generic’ infrastructure will be those such as food and beverages 
industries, and service sectors where local presence is essential, or where a scarce 
resource is cheaply available.  
The lesson for most peripheral countries is very much the same: dependence on static 
and generic location advantages – whether drawing from the development of 
institutions, infrastructure, stability, or low cost labour – is necessarily short term and 
short-sighted. The last two decades of increasing liberalisation, falling transportation 
and communication costs and investment in knowledge-based activities in East Asia 
has meant that the peripheral EU countries are no longer as attractive (although it 
should be noted that the lack of strong IPR enforcement in some Asian countries does 
provide a small window of opportunity). It is axiomatic that as industrial development 
takes place, the comparative advantage of these countries needs to shift away from 
low value adding activities to higher value adding activities, which are necessarily 
science-based.  
It is only in those sectors where ‘specialised’ location advantages associated with 
higher value adding exist that provide the opportunity to host the ‘right kinds’ of FDI 
can host countries benefit significantly from MNE activity in the long run. This 
requires a considerable amount of government interaction and investment. As 
countries reach a threshold level of technological capabilities, governments need to 
provide more active support through macro-organisational policies. This implies 
developing and fostering specific industries and technological trajectories, such that 
the location advantages they offer are less ‘generic’ and more specific, highly 
immobile and such that they encourage mobile investments to be locked into these 
assets. Many of the CEE countries have the basis for creating such science based 
location advantages. For instance, Poland has strengths in certain natural and life 
sciences, as does Hungary in electro-mechanical sectors. The Czech republic has 
opted to focus on the automotive sector.  
There are two points of caution that need to be raised here. First, in pursuing 
such a strategy, the peripheral EU countries face competition not just from Asia, but 
also from the ‘core’ developed economies of the EU which have systematically 
developed strengths in technology intensive sectors over decades, and can often out-
compete weaker, peripheral economies in terms of resources, incentives and 
opportunities.  Nonetheless, there are several niches and gaps in their technological 
competences that can be effectively exploited by the peripheral economies.  
Second, such a strategy requires systematic long-term investment, both in 
terms of building up the appropriate public infrastructure, and in promoting domestic 
capacity in both supplier and related activities. Many of the CEE countries have well-
trained and skilled work force, but the availability of a large stock of suitably 
qualified workers does not in itself result in efficient absorption of knowledge, or its 
efficient use in industrial development. This requires the presence of institutions and 
economic actors within industry which defines the stock of knowledge in a given 
location, and the efficient use of markets and hierarchies, be they intra-firm, intra-
industry or intra-country. This knowledge is not costless, and must be accumulated 
over time. Important externalities arise which impinge on the ease of diffusion and 
efficiency of absorption and utilisation of external knowledge (Narula 2004).  
Industrial policy where certain industries are selected for rapid growth by 
focused investments through intensive development of created assets can and do 
accelerate economic development. The examples of both the more advanced 
industrialising countries (such as the Asian NICs) and emerging economies such as 
Malaysia and Brazil illustrate this. Attracting specialised FDI to a particular sector 
can alter the sequence of industrial upgrading (Williamson and Hu 1994), because 
specialised FDI may help improve the created assets associated within a sector (say 
consumer electronics production). Created assets in this one sector may have 
significant knowledge flows externalities in another (say micro-electronics design), 
which in turn may represent significant input to another sector (say software 
development). But this assumes the presence of a virtuous circle, and the development 
of appropriate clusters.  
FDI-assisted growth requires the capacity to be a ‘strategic follower’ (Ramos 
2000). This requires a systematic understanding of what technological capabilities 
need to be developed or enhanced, and to seek to actively coordinate potential users 
with sources of the appropriate technologies. Asian governments that have pursued 
such a strategy successively have actively sought to identify, acquire and transfer 
technologies, with government agencies acting as market-makers. Left to their own 
means, firms have a tendency to be risk averse, and to avoid the financial and 
technological risk of upgrading their technological assets as long as these provide a 
reasonable rate of return. This short-term myopia is not unique to firms of any given 
nationality: governments in Asia – and particularly in Japan, Korea and Taiwan – 
sought to overcome or at least reduce the perceived risk levels by providing 
subsidised loans and other incentives to domestic firms that restructured their existing 
operations by adopting new technologies in the products and processes that promoted 
international best practise.  
The countries with the most successful technological upgrading – Korea, 
Taiwan and to a lesser extent Brazil – allocated subsidies in what Amsden and Hikino 
(2000) and Amsden (2001) call a ‘reciprocal control mechanism’. That is, incentives 
and subsidies whether to upgrade technologically, promote local content, expand 
exports or reduce import-dependence were subject to performance standards that were 
actively monitored, and in Amsden’s (2001) words, were ‘redistributive in nature and 
results-oriented’ and acted to prevent government failure.  
To be sure, upgrading of technological capabilities of domestic firms can no 
longer be pursued in quite the same way in a globalised world. International 
competition is a given, and there can be no return to the infant industry model.  While 
a number of CEE countries have had considerable investment in R&D, a majority of 
the formal R&D efforts were conducted by state-owned enterprises and the non-firm 
sector. While the role of the state must necessarily remain a significant investor in 
innovation, these policies need to be orchestrated with the private firm sector, whether 
domestic or foreign.  
 Market forces cannot substitute for the role of governments in developing and 
promoting a proactive industrial policy. Firms necessarily take a shorter term, profit 
maximising view because they are largely risk averse. MNEs and unrestrained flows 
of inward FDI may well lead to an increase in productivity and exports, but they do 
not necessarily result in increased competitiveness of the domestic sector or increased 
industrial capacity, which ultimately determines economic growth in the long run. 
FDI per se does not provide growth opportunities unless a domestic industrial sector 
exists which has the necessary technological capacity to profit from the externalities 
from MNE activity. This is well illustrated by the inability of many Asian countries 
which have relied on a passive FDI-dependent strategy to upgrade their industrial 
development. It should be remembered that unrestrained FDI inflows often results in 
‘crowding out’ of the domestic sector. FDI and domestic capabilities and a domestic 
sector need to be concatenated and properly phased if positive results are to be 
achieved. The lesson here is not that the role of governments should be substituted by 
the market, but that markets and governments can co-exist. 
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